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1Value Added Taxes, Chain Eects and Informality
Abstract
This paper investigates determinants of informal economic activity. We present an equilibrium model of
informality and test its implications using a survey of 48,000+ small rms in Brazil. We dene informality
as tax avoidance; rms in the informal sector avoid tax payments but suer other limitations. A novel
theoretical contribution in this model is the role of value added taxes in transmitting informality. It predicts
that the informality of a rm is correlated to the informality of rms from which it buys or sells. The
model also implies that higher tolerance for informal rms in one production stage increases tax avoidance
in downstream and upstream stages. Empirical analysis shows that, in fact, various measures of formality
of suppliers and purchasers (and its enforcement) are correlated with the formality of a rm. Even more
interestingly, when we look at sectors where Brazilian rms are not subject to the credit system of value
added tax, but instead the value added tax is applied at some stage of production at a rate that is estimated
by the tax authorities, this chain eect vanishes.
JEL Codes: H2, H3, K4.
21 Introduction
In this paper we investigate determinants of informality. It is dicult to dene informal
activities unambiguously, but estimates indicate that in 1990-1993 approximately 10% of
GDP in the United States was produced by individuals or rms that evaded taxes or engaged
in illegal pursuits. These activities may produce 25 to 35% of aggregate output in Latin
America, between 13 to 70% in Asian countries, around 15% in O.E.C.D. countries (see
Table 2 in Schneider and Enste [23]). The underground economy is also estimated to have
comprised between 6 and 63.5% in countries in the former Soviet Union and other Eastern
and Central European nations during the rst half of the 90's. (see Table 1 in Johnson et
al [13]).
Informality creates a scal problem, but there is also growing evidence that informal
rms are less ecient, perhaps because of their necessarily small scale, perhaps because of
their lack of access to credit or access to the infrastructure of legal protection provided by
the State. In many less developed countries, creating incentives for formalization is viewed
as an important step to increase aggregate productivity.
We present an equilibrium model of informality and test its implications using a survey
of 48,000+ small rms in Brazil. In our model informality is dened as tax avoidance. Firms
in the informal sector avoid paying taxes but suer from other limitations.
The model can be seen as a development of Rausch [19], who relied in the modeling
strategy of Lucas [16] in which managerial ability diers across agents in the economy, and
assumed a limitation on the size of informal rms. As in that paper, agents with low
managerial ability become informal managers and those with highest ability become formal
managers.1 Managers with more ability would naturally run larger rms; for this reason they
choose to join the formal sector, where they do not face size limitation. The marginal rm
trades o the cost of paying taxes versus the scale limitations of informal rms. As a result,
the marginal rm is smaller in the informal sector than it would be if it joined the formal
1In the working paper version of this article we provide an generalization of Rausch's model in which
capital and labor are chosen and the group of lowest ability individuals becomes workers. See de Paula and
Scheinkman [18].
3sector. Thus, as in Rausch [19], Fortin et al. [9] or Dabla-Norris et al. [5], a size gap develops.
Managers that are slightly more ecient than the manager of the marginal informal rm run
discretely larger rms. In this class of models, entrepreneurs that operate in the informal
sector are too inecient to benet from the lower capital costs and scale economies aorded
to formal entrepreneurs. In this sense these models agree with the results from a survey of
informal Mexican rms conducted by Mckenzie and Woodru that is reported in Fajnzylber
et al [8], where 75% of the respondents reported that they were too small to make it worth
their while to become formal.2
The main innovation of our theoretical analysis though is a focus on the role of value
added taxes (VAT) in transmitting informality. It exploits the idea that collecting value
added taxes according to a credit scheme sets in motion a mechanism for the transmission
of informality. The VAT is a prevalent form of indirect taxation: more than 120 nations had
adopted it by 2000.3 In the credit or invoice method that is often used, the value added
tax applies to each sale and each establishment receives a credit for the amount of tax paid
in the previous stages of the production chain. This credit is then used by the taxpayer
against future liabilities with the tax authorities. Since purchases from informal suppliers do
not generate tax credits and informal buyers cannot use tax payment from formal suppliers,
there is an incentive for informal (formal) rms to deal with other informal (formal) rms.4
Our empirical analysis shows that, in fact, various measures of formality of suppliers and
purchasers (and its enforcement) are correlated with the formality of a rm. These ndings
survive when we use instrumental variables to control for possible simultaneity. Even more
interestingly, when we look at sectors where Brazilian rms are not subject to the credit
system of value added tax, but instead the VAT is applied at some stage of production at a
rate that is estimated by the tax authorities, this chain eect vanishes.
Using data from the Brazilian Ministry of Labor, we also construct measures of en-
2...presumably relative to cost.
3See Appendix 4 in Schenk and Oldman [22].
4To our knowledge, the only other study to investigate the informal sector in conjunction with a VAT
structure is Emran and Stiglitz [7]. Their focus is on the consequences of informality for a revenue neutral
tax reform involving value added and trade taxes.
4forcement of formality in the labor market. Our estimates show that enforcement in the
clients' or suppliers' sectors has a positive and signicant eect on the probability of formal-
ization of an economic unit.
Since the mid 90's, following the lead of the Federal government, several Brazilian
states introduced SIMPLES programs that simplied and lowered the VAT rates for small
rms. The State of S~ ao Paulo, the largest and richest state in Brazil, for example introduced
its SIMPLES in 1998. Rio Grande do Sul, another large and relatively rich southern state,
started its own program only in 2005. We use data on the Brazilian states and two rounds of
the Brazilian survey of small rms to evaluate the impact of the introduction of these state
programs. Our results point to a signicantly positive impact of the program introduction,
increasing formalization directly and, through chain eects, indirectly.
The model in this paper ignores several alternative reasons for informality, such as
xed cost of complying with regulations, labor taxes or the existence of a minimum-wage.
It also ignores benets of formality that have been highlighted in the literature | such as
access to participation in the legal system and other civic institutions. Considering these
omitted costs and benets should not change the qualitative implications of our model, which
does not aim at providing an exhaustive explanation for informality. In addition, we focus
on informality from the viewpoint of rms, not workers. Finally, our model ignores partial
compliance: rms either pay their taxes in full or not at all. This is a simplication that is
also present in our data, which only provides us with binary information on formalization.
Other papers that investigate causes and determinants of informality include Loayza [15],
Johnson et al. [13] and Friedman et al. [10] which provide evidence of an association between
the size of the underground economy and higher taxes, more labor market restrictions, and
poorer institutions (bureaucracy, corruption and legal environment). Junqueira and Mon-
teiro [14] and Fajnzylber et al. [8] are recent papers that use an earlier (1997) wave of the
the survey that we employ in this paper. These papers exploit the introduction of the SIM-
PLES law, which simplied compliance and reduced rates for small rms in Brazil, to make
inferences on the relationship between taxes and informality. Although the empirical results
in our paper speak to a somewhat dierent set of questions (for instance, the multi-stage
5transmission of informality captured by our model), use data from a dierent year (2003
versus 1997) and refer to a dierent denition for formalization,5 their empirical results are
broadly in line with ours. In particular, both Junqueira and Monteiro [14] and Fajnzylber
et al. [8] nd that the enactment of SIMPLES increased formality.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next Section we develop
a model with two stages of production and VAT. Section 3 contains the empirical results
obtained using data on informal rms in Brazil and Section 4 concludes.
2 A Model for Informality
In this section we present a very simple model that illustrates the transmission of informality
across sectors as a result of taxes on value added. In Section 3 we document that this
mechanism is relevant for informality in Brazil.
There are two stages of production: \upstream" and \downstream". All individuals
in the model are entrepreneurs and, for simplicity, we assume that they are specialized in
one of the stages. Each entrepreneur in the upstream sector is characterized by his ability
u > 0: The density of u is gu(): An entrepreneur of ability u can produce u units of
the intermediate good in the formal sector. An informal entrepreneur, if detected by the
authorities, looses all prot. The probability of being detected increases with the size of the
rm. While a more general form for this probability of detection can be adopted, we assume
here, for simplicity that there exists an output level y > 0; such that entrepreneurs that
produce no more than y > 0 are never detected but those who produce more than y > 0
are detected with probability 1. Thus the production function in the informal sector for an
entrepreneur of ability u is min(y;u):
5Junqueira and Monteiro [14] and Fajnzylber et al. [8] use municipal licensing as proxy for formalization
instead tax registration, the measure we use. Junqueira and Monteiro recognize that tax registration would be
a more appropriate indication of formalization, but opt for licensing because the question on tax registration
was only asked for those who indicated that their rm had been \legally constituted" | that is, a contract
had been registered with the proper authorities. We do not view this as a problem, since according to
Brazilian law only legally constituted rms are eligible for tax registration.
6Downstream entrepreneurs are characterized by an ability parameter d with density
gd(): An agent with ability d, if in the formal sector, produces dx units of the formal
good using x units of the intermediate good. In analogy to what we assumed for upstream
entrepreneurs, we assume that in the informal sector, only a limited amount of input can be
used and the production function becomes d min(x;x); where x > 0:
Both gu and gd are continuous and that there exists u < y for which gu(u) > 0; and
that gd(d) > 0 for d > 0:
The nal good is tradeable and has an exogenous price which we use as numer aire.
Firms in the formal sector pay an ad-valorem tax rate of  and we write  = 1   : The
value added tax is levied by the credit method: the tax rate applies to each sale and each
establishment receives a credit for the amount of tax paid in the previous stages of production.
Because of the tax credit, the prices paid for informal and formal goods may be distinct and





f(u) = pfu (1)

u
i (u) = pi minfu;yg (2)
for the prot of an upstream rm with manager of quality u if it produces in the formal
(informal) sector. Downstream rms face a slightly more complicated problem, since they








   pix]g; (3)
for the prot of a downstream rm with a manager with ability d that chooses to operate







   pix]g; (4)
for the prot of a downstream rm with a manager of ability d that chooses to operate in
the informal sector.
















while if he buys from the informal sector he demands xf(d;
p
); since the tax credit does not
apply.
We now derive aggregate demand and supply of the intermediate good in the formal
and informal sectors as a function of prevailing prices. Since we are interested in equilib-
rium prices we may restrict the range of prices to 0 < pf  pi  pf: In fact, if pf > pi
prot maximization and equations (3) and (4) imply that both formal and informal en-
trepreneurs downstream would buy from informal upstream rms. However, every upstream
entrepreneur will prefer to produce in the formal sector. Similarly, if pi > pf every down-
stream entrepreneur would prefer to buy from formal rms. However, small u agents would
prefer to produce informally. Furthermore when pf  pi  pf downstream informal (formal)
entrepreneurs weakly prefer to buy from informal (formal) producers. If these inequalities
are strict, preferences are also strict.
The following proposition shows the existence of cuto points for each stage, u(pi;pf)
and d(pi;pf) such that all managers with ability below the cuto (weakly) prefer informality
and all those with ability above the cut-o points prefer to join the formal sector.
Proposition 1 (i) If u < u(pi;pf) :=
piy
pf  y then u
i (u)  u
f(u); and if u > u(pi;pf)
then u
i (u) < u
f(u):
(ii) There exists a d(pi;pf) such that if d < d(pi;pf) then d
i(d)  d
f(d) and if
d > d(pi;pf) then d
i(d) < d
f(d):
8At the cuto points the size and input demand of rms are discontinuous with respect
to the quality of the entrepreneur: the marginal informal managers in both sectors are always
constrained.





i(d) then the optimal choice of the rm with manager of quality d;
xf(d;p); where p = pf if the rm's optimal choice is to buy the formal good and p =
pi
 if




> x  xi(d;p);
for any : In particular, the output of the smallest downstream formal rm is strictly bigger
than the output of the largest downstream informal rm.
The proofs of these propositions and the proof of existence of an equilibrium price
vector (pi;pf) are in the Appendix.
2.1 Comparative statics
In the model all ineciencies arise from rms that choose to be informal and too small. As
exposited in the previous Section, these choices depend on the values of parameters such
as the tax rate (1   ) and the level of tolerance in the downstream stage  x and in the
upstream stage  y. Although these parameters can in principle be optimally chosen by a
government, subject to the government's enforcement technology and budget constraint, we
will not consider here the optimal tax and enforcement problems.6 Nonetheless it is useful
to consider the eect of these parameters on equilibrium outcomes.
The eect of tax rate changes on the composition of the economy can be disentangled
into a direct eect, holding prices constant, and an indirect eect, which operates through
the adjustment of equilibrium prices. The direct eect of taxes on u and d is easily seen








In other words, for given prices, an increase in the tax rate (decrease in ) leads to an increase
in the informal sector in both stages. The rst inequality follows because u = piy=pf. The




i() does not depend on  directly (equation (4)) and d
f() increases in  (equation
(3)), d increases with the tax rate (decreases with ).
Since a change in taxes also aects prices and these in turn aect the cutos, the
total eect must account for the equilibrium adjustment of prices. The next proposition
establishes that increases in taxes increase informality in both stages. In addition, it states
comparative statics results for prices and cutos in one stage when tolerance to informality






















The derivation of these results is presented in a Web Appendix. The total eect of
taxes is still in the same direction as the direct eect. Also, as expected, higher tolerance in
one stage implies a larger informal sector in the other stage. The impact of an increase in
tolerance on the informality at the same stage is less clear. In the case of the upstream stage,
for example, the direct eect (@u=@y) is positive, but the indirect eect (change in prices
times reaction of u to prices) is negative (see Web Appendix). We nevertheless conjecture
that the total eect is positive. Numerical simulations support our conjecture: an increase
in tolerance in the upstream sector increases the proportion of informal rms upstream and
downstream. For  = 0:7; = 0:15;x = 0:1;d;u  U[0;1], Figure 1 shows that as y
10increases, the proportion of upstream rms that are informal increases. As a result the price
of the informal intermediate good pi decreases and some of the downstream formal rms
opt for informality. The fall in demand for the formal intermediate good causes a fall in its
price pf: These qualitative features are unchanged for other parameter choices. A symmetric




In this section we explore implications of our theoretical framework using a dataset on infor-
mal rms in Brazil. Tax noncompliance is an important phenomenon in Brazil. Schneider
and Enste [23] estimate that informality represents more than one-quarter of the Brazilian
economy. Its value added tax system was established in the sixties and value added taxes
represent approximately 35% of total tax collection.
3.1 Data
Our principal data source is the ECINF survey (Pesquisa de Economia Informal Urbana) on
informal rms realized by the Brazilian Statistics Bureau (IBGE). We used the 2003 edition of
that survey, collected in October 2003, which contains information on 48,701 entrepreneurs in
urban regions from all states in the Brazilian federation. We also used the 1997 edition for the
analysis present in subsection 3.5. The survey focused on units with ve or less employees.7
The sampling strategy uses the demographic census as a frame. First, preliminary interviews
screened households for the presence of at least one entrepreneur with a business employing
7The Brazilian small business administration SEBRAE denes small businesses as those with less than
10 workers in commerce or services or less than 20 workers in all other sectors. According to SEBRAE's
Boletim Estat stico de Micros e Pequenas Empresas: Primeiro Semestre de 2005 (http://www.sebrae.com.br),
in 2002 small businesses accounted for 93.6% of the total number of rms, employed 36.2% of the workers
and responded for 10.3% of wages in 2002.
11ve or less people, for possible inclusion in the survey. The sampling was done in two
stages: in each state (of a total of 27) the primary sampling units (census tracts) were
stratied geographically in three strata (state capital, other census tracts in the capital's
metropolitan area and remaining census tracts). In a second step, the primary sampling
units were stratied according to levels of income within the geographical stratum. Census
tracts were randomly selected with a probability proportional to the number of households
in the sector. For each selected census tract a total of 16 households was randomly chosen
for interviews.8. Interviewees were told that the information collected for the survey was
condential and would only be utilized for statistical purposes and, in fact, a vast majority
declared that their rm was informal.
An ideal dataset for testing our model would contain information on the production
chain associated with each rm. Although the ECINF contains certain characteristics of
a rm's clientele (whether they were predominantly large or small companies, persons or
governmental institutions), this information is quite limited. To complement these data
we used the input-output matrix information available from IBGE. We computed inter-
sectoral technical input coecients and measures of output sectoral destination using the
2003 Brazilian national accounts.9
3.2 Description of Variables
We eliminated rms with owners who were less than 15 years old and the observations
lacking education or gender information. Entrepreneurs who claimed that their main client
was a governmental institution, which comprised less than 1% of the original data, were also
discarded. This restricted our sample to around 48,000 observations.
8The census tract is a sub-municipal geographical partition. For the 1997 edition of the survey there
were on average 3.1 such census tracts per municipality covered by the survey, with as many as 62 tracts in
the municipality of Goi^ ania and as few as 1.7 tracts per municipality in the State of Maranh~ ao. For more
information on the sampling strategies employed, see Almeida and Bianchini [1].
9Tables 1 and 2 under \Tabelas de Recursos e Usos" available under National Accounts on
http://www.ibge.gov.br for 2003. The construction of technical coecients follows the European System
of Integrated Economic Accounts (ESA) specications (see ten Raa [26]).
12Table 1 summarizes the principle variables used in this paper. The rst variable
indicates formalization; it is a dummy variable that equals one if the rm is registered with
the Brazilian tax authorities.10 For rms in economic sectors that qualify for tax substitution
(see subsection 3.6 for an explanation), tax sub takes the value one. The next two variables
are dummies for rms that sell their products mainly to large rms (large cl) or small rms
(small cl) (where large rms are those with more than ve employees). Other alternatives are
persons or ignored. Outsidehouse is a dummy that equals one when the activity is performed
outside the home. The number of employees (# employees) includes the owner. Even though
the survey focused on rms with ve or less employees, a few units (less than 0.1%) employ
more than ve people due to the lag between screening and interviewing. The variables
revenue, other job and bank loan are self-explanatory. Education is a categorical variable
with values depicted in Table 2. Age of the owner is in years and gender equals 1 for male.
The variable homeowner  # rooms is a measure of wealth and is zero for non-homeowners
and otherwise displays the number of rooms in the house. The variables log inv and log
inst measure the logarithm of investments and capital installations in October/2003 (R$
1,000).11 Prot equals revenue minus expenses in October/2003 (also in R$ 1,000). Logwage
denotes the logarithm of the total expenditures in wages (in R$1,000) divided by the number
of employees in the rm.12 The variables cl form and sup form measure formalization among
customers and suppliers of a rm (see subsection 3.3 for the construction of these variables).
[Tables 1 and 2 here]
Each rm in the sample is classied into economic activities following the CNAE
10The tax registry is the Cadastro Nacional de Pessoas Jur dicas, which replaced the previous system, the
Cadastro Geral de Contribuintes (CGC), used in the 1997 survey. This variable is the most representative of
formalization for our purposes, but we have nonetheless experimented with using \legally constituted rms"
and obtained virtually identical results. This is not surprising, since, as we already mentioned, the latter is
a prerequisite for tax registration and the correlation between the two measures of informality is 0.98.
11The value of installations refers to owned installations. Rented equipment is not included. Only 7% of
formal rms and 7% of informal rms reported any rented equipment
12For comparison, annual GDP per capita in Brazil in 2003 was R$ 8,694.47.(log(8:69447=12) =
log(0:72454) =  0:13).
13(Classica c~ ao Nacional de Atividades Econ^ omicas) classication.13 We were able to match
these CNAE activities to the sectors in the Brazilian National Accounting System (NAS)
using equivalence tables that are available from IBGE. Typically several CNAE activities
correspond to a single NAS sector, but there are a few exceptions in which a single activity
corresponds to multiple NAS sectors. The use and make tables of the NAS provide vectors
of input and output coecients. Using these NAS vectors, the value of output in each
NAS sector, and the correspondence tables, we constructed coecients indicating how much
input each CNAE activity uses from each of the NAS sectors and how much output of each
CNAE activity is allocated to each of the NAS sectors. We also computed a measure of the
proportion of rms in our sample with tax registration in each NAS sector.14 The ECINF
survey also has its own aggregate sectoral characterization, and these ECINF sectors are
listed in Table 3.
The last two variables in Table 1 are measures of formalization enforcement for sup-
pliers and customers and were constructed as follows. The Brazilian Ministry of Labor, using
its own sector classication, reports on the number of rms in each sector and state visited
during 2002 by its inspectors.15 Using data from the IBGE's \Cadastro Central de Empre-
sas", we normalized the number of visits in each state and sector by the number of persons
employed in that state and sector.16 The Ministry of Labor classication has only 11 sectors,
and each CNAE activity or NAS sector corresponds to a single Ministry of Labor sector.
Hence we may construct unambiguously output coecients indicating how much of a given
CNAE activity's production is sold to each of the Ministry of Labor sectors. Assuming that
a rm's clients are in the same state,17 we generated an index of client formalization enforce-
ment as a weighted average of the enforcement variables (visits per persons employed), using
13IBGE's website (http://www.ibge.gov.br) provides a description of this classication.
14For the less 4% of the rms in our sample with a CNAE activity that corresponds to multiple NAS
sectors we counted the rms in each of the multiple NAS sectors.
15Enforcement data was obtained from the \Relat orio de Gest~ ao da Fiscalizac~ ao do FGTS" and was
employed by Almeida and Carneiro [2].
16We also used the number of rms in the state-sector to normalize the number of visits, and obtained
roughly similar results.
17Only 5.23% of the respondents in our sample claim to sell in other states
14as weights the output allocation coecients corresponding to the rm's activity. We used ac-
tivities' input demand coecients to obtain an analogous measure of supplier formalization
enforcement.
Table 4 contains probit estimates for the formalization variable tax reg. The signs
obtained for each one of the regressors are as expected. The coecient of the variable
\working outside the home" is positive. The coecients are also positive for variables related
to the size of the rm (number of employees and revenue), credit (bank loan), or the quality
of the entrepreneurial input (education, age or having no additional job). Since women
in Brazil are likely to have substantial household duties, the sign on the gender variable is
probably related to entrepreneurial input. These variables may also partially control for other
determinants of informality, such as opportunities in the labor market.18 The coecients on
all these variables are statistically signicant.
[Table 4 here]
In the estimates we used dummies to control for state and ECINF sector (according
to the specication in Table 3).
3.3 Chain Eects on Formalization
One initial approach to investigate the existence of cross-rms eects of formalization was
to employ a characterization of a rm's clientele in the ECINF survey. Interviewees were
asked to declare whether sales were principally to large rms (more than ve employees),
small rms, or persons. Sales to rms tend to increase the probability of formalization with
a bigger eect being associated with large rms as depicted in Table 5. These correlations
are supportive of the existence of a chain eect in formalization.
We also used a composite measure of formalization among a rm's suppliers to ex-
amine this chain eect. For a rm in CNAE activity i, we dene its suppliers's formality
as
18With the available data it is not possible to control for business cycle variations another potentially
relevant determinant of informality that is not captured in our model.
15supplierformali =
P
j tcij  formalityj P
j tcij
(7)
where formalityj is the percentage of rms in NAS sector j that display tax registration19
and tcij is the required amount of input from NAS sector j per monetary unit of output
produced by a rm in activity i. Some caveats apply. This measure of supplier's formality
only accounts for potential suppliers that are present in the survey and, in particular, ignores
all suppliers that are large rms. On the other hand, the technical coecients are obtained
from a sample of formal rms. The net impact on the measure of formalization is unclear.
Nevertheless, the results of our analysis favor the model: the coecients attached to this
variable are positive and statistically signicant. The estimation results are in Table 5. The
marginal eect of supplier formalization on the probability of being formal is 0.358.20
An analogous strategy measures formalization across a rm's clients. Formalization
is now weighted according to the output break up by NAS sector:
clientformali =
P
j oaij  formalityj P
j oaij
; (8)
where oaij is the fraction of output of CNAE activity i that goes to NAS sector j: The results
are depicted in Table 5. The coecient on this composite measure of client formalization is
positive and statistically signicant, with a marginal impact of 0.618.
[Table 5 here]
We also ran regressions including large cl, small cl and the client and supplier
formality proxies. The coecients are all positive and only the supplier-formality coecient
is no longer signicant. To address the likely correlation of large cl with observable de-
terminants of formality for a given rm, the regressions in Table 5 include ECINF sector
and state dummies and other covariates which we viewed as the most natural confounding
19NAS sectors that are not sampled in the ECINF survey were excluded in this calculation.
20The marginal eect of covariate xk is dened as Ex[@P(formalizationjx)=@xk] for a continuous covariate
and Ex[P(formalizationjx^ k;xk = 1)   P(formalizationjx^ k;xk = 0)] for a binary covariate. Here x^ k denotes
the vector of all covariates except the kth one.
16variables. We have nonetheless tried additional specications. First, we experimented with
a narrower sector classication (the CNAE activity designation) for controls instead of the
economic sectors listed in Table 3. The results are unchanged. We also estimated the regres-
sions of subsamples with dierent sectors (manufacturing and services) and the conclusions
are basically unchanged. To handle potential correlation of capital intensity of production
across various stages of a given production process we included a quadratic polynomial on
capital (installations) in our regressions and the marginal eects are essentially unchanged
for the main variables (large cl and small cl).
While the degree of tax compliance among a rm's suppliers and customers seems
to aect formalization, an endogeneity problem may arise since suppliers and customers of
a rm respond to the degree of tax compliance of that rm. This would tend to bias the
estimator upwards. Since the variable we use as a proxy for formalization among clients is an
imperfect measure of tax compliance, one cannot rule out the possibility of attenuation bias in
the opposite direction of the simultaneity bias as is the case in some models with misclassied
categorical regressors (see Bound et al. [3]). To address this potential endogeneity we ran
instrumental variable versions of the results displayed in Table 5 using the average education
level in an entrepreneur's census tract as an instrument for the formalization of his clients.
For the average education level in the census tract to be a valid instrument, it must only
aects one's propensity to be formal through formalization of his or her clients and not
respond to the formalization of a single individual.21 As an additional instrumental variable
we use the time (in minutes) it takes for the entrepreneur to arrive at a bank branch (nearest
bank).22 Since our dependent variable (tax reg) and the endogenous variables (large cl
and small cl) are binary, we run our IV regressions using a binary probit dropping small
cl from the regression of interest.23 The coecient on largecl is positive and remains
21A similar strategy was used in DiPasquale and Glaeser [6].
22We thank a referee for this suggestion.
23Since both our outcome of interest (tax reg) and endogenous variables are dichotomous, standard
procedures such as TSLS or Rivers and Vuong [21] are inadequate and we used a bivariate probit to generate
our IV estimates as suggested in Heckman [11]. To achieve numerical convergence to a maximum, we had to
drop revenue. We repeated the estimation using linearized TSLS and the Rivers-Vuong approach including
17so in the IV version. In fact, the IV version displays an even larger coecient, which we
ascribe to the attenuation eect of imperfect measurement of supplier formalization in the
non-instrumented estimation.24
[Table 6 here]
We also ran instrumented and non-instrumented probit regressions using a subsample of rms
having only large and small rm clients and using the latter as baseline. The coecient for
the large client dummy is positive in the non-instrumented version of this estimation and it
again increases when we use the instrumental variable. To sum up: instrumental variables
are not easy to obtain in the present context. Nevertheless, the results are robust given the
available variables in our sample.
3.4 The Eect of Enforcement
The previous results show evidence of correlation in the degree of informality across stages of
production. Our model also suggests that increased tolerance towards informality in the up-
stream stage leads to a reduction in formalization in the downstream stage. Similarly, higher
tolerance for informality among downstream rms should be accompanied by higher degree
of tax avoidance in the upstream stage. We use the measures of formalization enforcement in
the labor market described in subsection 3.2 as an indicator for monitoring within each state
and Ministry of Labor sectors of a rm's suppliers and clients. Our estimates in Table 7 show
that enforcement in upstream or downstream stages has a positive and signicant eect on
the probability of formalization.25
revenue and the results are qualitatively unchanged.
24A similar phenomenon is observed in Card [4], where IV estimates for return to schooling are about
twice as large as OLS estimates.
25Since the Ministry of Labor uses a dierent denition of sectors than ECINF, we may in addition control
for (Ministry of Labor dened) own sector enforcement. The inclusion of this variable leaves the coecients
of the interaction variables roughly unchanged, but it implies a negative association between enforcement in
one's own sector and formalization. This is probably a result of simultaneity between own-stage-enforcement
and own-stage-informality. If monitoring eorts are concentrated on sectors where formality is low, the
coecient on own-stage-enforcement would be negative. This simultaneity would justify caution with respect
18[Table 7 here]
As a further check on the robustness of the estimated eects of downstream or up-
stream enforcement on formalization, we have also obtained results for the regressions pre-
sented on Table 7 only for those individuals who have become owners within the last year (be-
tween October/2002 and October/2003). The results remain highly signicant: the marginal
eect of sup enf in the rst regression is 0.589 (std.error = 0.283,p-value = 0.038) and the
marginal eect of cl enf is still positive at 1.12 (std.error = 0.301, p-value=0.000).
3.5 The SIMPLES Tax Program
In 1996 the Brazilian federal government established the SIMPLES tax program, targeted at
small rms { those with roughly less than R$1,000,000 in annual revenues. It consolidated
taxes and social security contributions in a single payment and simplied verication and
remittance procedures for tax collection. Although states and municipalities were allowed
to join the system for the collection of value added taxes, very few did. More than 20 states
eventually established instead their own state-level versions of the SIMPLES system for the
collection of VAT and other state taxes. In 1998, for example, the state of S~ ao Paulo estab-
lished a local version of the SIMPLES program. The system exempted rms with less than
R$ 120,000 annual revenues from the collection of state VAT and oered reduced rates to
rms with at most R$1.2 million in annual revenues. The program provided rms with a
signicant reduction in VAT. For example, a rm with monthly sales of R$60,000 with input
costs of R$20,000 would owe R$7,200 in VAT before the SIMPLES. Under the new program
the VAT would total less than R$1,300.
We used the rst round of the ECINF survey, collected in 1997, and its 2003 edition
to measure the eect of this reduction in VAT on formalization. For comparison we obtained
data for states that established their state SIMPLES before and after 2003. Table 8 dis-
to the inclusion of own-stage-enforcement beyond the state and ECINF-sector controls already present in
the estimates. While enforcement policy for a given stage may be responding to informality in that stage,
it is nonetheless implausible that enforcement in one stage would respond to informality in preceding or
subsequent stages in the production chain.
19plays the state laws and their publication dates for those states that established SIMPLES
programs before 2003. Two states, Rio Grande do Sul (RS) and Minas Gerais (MG), imple-
mented SIMPLES after 2003, and others (Amazonas (AM), Piau  (PI), Mato Grosso (MT),
Tocantins (TO) and Roraima (RR)) have not established a program.
[Table 8 here]
Table 9 displays results from a probit model where dummy variables for the state
and pre- and post-introduction of the state SIMPLES are used to assess the variation in
the formalization. We applied the same controls we used in our previous formalization
regressions.26 The results point to a positive impact of the program's introduction with a
marginal eect of 1.4 percentage points on formalization, an increase in the probability of
formalization of approximately one-tenth.
[Table 9 here]
We could not obtain data on eligibility in each states' SIMPLES program, because
each state has a dierent tax code with a myriad of case-specic rules and contingencies.
Instead, we took eligibility to participate in the federal SIMPLES as a proxy for the eligibility
to participate in the state SIMPLES programs in our sample. 27 Table 10 reports the impact
of eligibility for the state SIMPLES. For the eligible rms in states where the SIMPLES
prevailed by 2003, the marginal eect of selling mostly to large or small clients on the
likelihood of having a tax registration, a measure of the chain eect on formalization, is
positive for both and signicant for the former. The marginal eect associated with having
a large client increased by 5.6% for rms in states that instituted the SIMPLES between 1997
and 2003. The marginal eect associated with having a small client increased by 1.4%. The
estimated marginal eect for rms that were not eligible to participate in state SIMPLES
is not signicantly dierent from zero. The null hypothesis that H0 : SIMPLES  2003 
Large Client + Ineligible  SIMPLES  2003  Large Client = 0 has a p-value of 0.67. The
26Standard errors are not clustered by census tract since their denition varied between 1997 and 2003.
27See the Appendix in Assunc~ ao and Monteiro [14] for a list of eligible activities for the federal SIMPLES
20p-value for the null hypothesis that SIMPLES2003Small Client+IneligibleSIMPLES
2003  Small Client = 0 is 0.4577.
[Table 10 here]
3.6 Robustness: Tax Substitution
Brazilian tax law imposes tax substitution (\substitui c~ ao tribut aria") in certain activities.28
Under this tax collection system, the value added tax is charged at some stage in the pro-
duction chain at a rate estimated by the tax authorities. This method tends to be adopted
for activities with a reduced set of initial producers and many smaller units at the subse-
quent stages of production, but in principle the tax may be applied at any single stage of
production. In Brazil, value added taxes on tires are paid by the tire manufacturer, based
on an estimated sale price to nal consumers. No VAT is due by any downstream seller of
tires. The tire may be sold to a distributor which then sells it to an auto parts store that
in turn sells it to a garage which nally sells it to a consumer. None of these transactions
would generate any VAT credit or obligation. Hence the chain eect of client formalization
should be much less pronounced for rms in which a substantial part of activities are subject
to tax substitution.
We ran probit estimates for rms in activities where tax substitution is imposed.
These activities (and their CNAE numerical designation) are automobile and auto-parts
manufacturing (34001, 34002, 35010, 35020, 35030, 35090), production of tires (25010), pro-
duction and distribution of liquor (15050 and 53030), cigarettes (16000), commercialization
of automobiles and tires (50010, 50020, 50030 and 54040), distribution of fuel (50050 and
53065) and oil rening (23010 and 23020).
The results concerning investment and installations, number of employees, and the
entrepreneur's education level remain qualitatively as before. In Table 11 we interact tax-
substitution with our measure of formality of the clients. To facilitate comparisons with
the results in Table 6 we again consolidate the dummy variables indicating large rm and
28Tax substitution is not peculiar to Brazil. See [20].
21small rm clients as a single variable. The coecient of the interaction term is negative and
signicant. This is implied by the regression run on the subsample of rms involved in the
production of goods and services eligible for tax substitution (Table 11). The coecient on
client formalization ceases to be positive. If anything, there is evidence for a negative rather
than positive coecient.
[Table 11 here]
Tax substitution raises a natural question: When is it advantageous to replace the
VAT by a tax on a single stage? We now discuss a numerical example that illustrates
the economic forces that determine the optimal choice. Fix the level x of tolerance in the
downstream stage and vary the level of tolerance y in the upstream stage. We will consider
two scenarios. In the rst scenario, a sales tax is applied only in the downstream sector;
producers of the intermediary good are tax exempt. In this case all upstream rms choose to
be formal and a single price prevails in the market for the intermediate good. The upstream
tolerance level y has no eect on equilibrium quantities and, in particular, on the total tax
collection T or on the output net of taxes of the nal good. Now consider a value added tax
that aects both sectors. To insure that the government's budget constraint is satised, for
each level of y nd a value added tax rate (y) such that the total tax collection equals T:
It is intuitive that as y becomes larger, making informality easier in the upstream sector,
the tax rate must be increased to maintain total tax collection. This intuition is veried
in this example as illustrated in Figure 3. The tax rate is relatively low when y is small,
but increases as y grows. Furthermore, as shown in Figure 2, for small values of y, the net
output of the nal good is larger than it would be if we only taxed the nal good. At the
other extreme, when y is very large, the output of the nal good is smaller under a VAT
system. Again this result is quite intuitive - if it is very dicult to impose formality in one
stage relative to imposing on the other stage, it may be preferable to only tax the latter.
When the stage where enforcement is easiest is downstream, the optimal choice is a sales
tax, otherwise forward tax substitution may be desirable.
[Figures 2 and 3 here]
224 Conclusion
An implication of our model is that informal rms are smaller, less productive and use less
inputs. In addition, informality is transmitted through vertical relationships when value
added taxes are levied through the credit method. Using microdata from surveys conducted
in Brazil, we conrmed implications of the model.
In the model, informal rms are less ecient than formal ones, but our analysis is
silent concerning the optimal amount of informality. To discuss this question one must also
model the cost of enforcement, presumably as a function of a rm's size, and the value of
tax revenues.
Tax authorities in Brazil impose tax substitution hoping to increase compliance. Our
model predicts a decrease in the interaction eect when tax substitution is imposed, but does
not make any prediction concerning the eect of tax substitution on the level of informality.
The rms in our sample that produce goods or services subject to tax substitution tend
to have more individuals as main clients and to be owned by less educated entrepreneurs;
factors associated with less formality. Nonetheless, the dierence in the rate of formalization
between these rms and other rms is 7.8 percentage points (with a standard error of .4),
a very large dierence when compared with the average level of 13.2% in our sample. This
increased formalization probably reects the criterium used by Brazilian tax authorities. Tax
substitution is imposed when at some level in the chain the typical producer is a large rm
which is then charged the estimated value added tax. If these large rms cannot aord to
become informal and pay the estimated value added tax, smaller rms in the same production
chain will face lower costs to formality than the typical small rm in Brazil and, for this
reason, may opt to become formal more often.
Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
(i) is immediate from equations (1) and (2). To show that (ii) holds note that d enters the
denition of the prot function of formal rms exactly as an output price and hence, from the
23properties of prot functions with respect to output prices, we know that its derivative with
respect to d is proportional to xf(d;p) which goes to innity as d ! 1: Furthermore, the
function d
i(d) is convex and, since supply functions of rms must slope up, if, conditional
on informality, the choice of a rm of ability  satises xi() = x then the optimal choice
conditional on informality, xi(d) = x for d  ; and as a consequence, d
i(d) is linear for
d  : In addition, whenever xi(d) < x; the informal rm's constraint is not binding. In
this case, since pf  pi

d
i = '(pi) > '(pf)










f(d); provided d > 0. 
Proof of Proposition 2
(i) is obvious. For (ii), suppose rst that it is optimal for the rm with manager of quality
d to buy the formal good. If xf(d;pf) < x; since
d(xf(d;pf))
   pfxf(d;pf)  (dx

f(d;pf)   pfxf(d;pf));
the rm would prefer to be in the informal sector and buy xf(d;pf) of formal inputs. If
the rm bought the informal good and xf(d;
pi

















the rm would prefer to be in the informal sector and buy xf(d;
pi
 ) of informal inputs.
Consequently, xf(d;pf)  x and x  xi(d;p) for any d. Furthermore, the entrepreneur
d(pi;pf) must be indierent between being formal or informal. Since informal (formal)
entrepreneurs weakly prefer to buy from informal (formal) suppliers, we must have:
d(pi;pf)x







In particular, choosing d = d(pi;pf) and p = pf shows the discontinuity at the marginal
rms. 
24Existence of Equilibrium
Because of the possibility of indierence, we have supply and demand correspondences in-
stead of functions. We will write S(pi;pf) for the set of possible aggregate supply vectors
(si(pi;pf);sf(pi;pf)) obtained from the choices of prot maximizing entrepreneurs in the











If pf = pi = 0 then S(pi;pf) = f0g: Finally when pf = pi 6= 0 a point (si;sf) 2 S(pi;pf)









We write X(pi;pf) for the set of possible aggregate demand vectors (xi(pi;pf);xf(pi;pf))
obtained from the choices of prot maximizing entrepreneurs in the downstream stage.
When pf = pi formal rms are indierent between buying the formal or informal
input, but informal rms prefer buying from informal rms. Hence we can allocate all
formal rms with managers below a certain threshold to buying in the informal sector with
the complement interval assigned to purchase in the formal sector.30 In this case, a point















29In principle we could assign any subset of entrepreneurs with productivity below y to the informal sector,
but there is always an interval containing the origin that would produce exactly the same aggregate output.
30As before, these assignments can reproduce the demands realized by any arbitrary assignment of rms
to each sector.
25If pf < pi < pf formal (informal) rms prefer to buy from formal (informal) rms.









If pf = pi informal rms are indierent, but formal rms prefer buying from formal
rms. Hence we may assign informal rms arbitrarily to buying formal or informal inputs.












An equilibrium is a vector (pi;pf) such that 9z 2 X(pi;pf)
T
S(pi;pf): We will present
the proof of existence of an equilibrium price in two steps. First we will set pi = pf with
    1: For each  we will show that there exists a unique pi() such that if (pi;pf) =
(pi();
pi()
 ) then the sum of aggregate supply of the formal and informal intermediate goods
equals the sum of aggregate demands. We then show that there exits a unique  such that
(pi();
pi()
 ) is an equilibrium. We will use the following preliminary result which is proven
in the web appendix:
Lemma 1 If pf < pi < pf then d(pi;pf) decreases with pi and it increases with pf:
Further, if     1 then, d(pi;
pi
) increases with pi:
We now return to the equilibrium analysis. For  =  (pi = pf) the sum of the


















26It is easy to check that this last expression goes to zero as pi ! 1 and to 1 as pi ! 0:
Furthermore, since demand of any type decreases with the price of the input, and, from
Proposition 2 xf(d;pi=)x, using the Lemma above it is immediate that aggregate demand
is monotonically decreasing with pi. Hence there exists a unique pi() for which the sum of
supplies equal the sum of demands.






















Just as before, the result in the Lemma insures the monotonicity properties that yield the
existence of a unique pi() that equates the sum of aggregate demands with that of aggregate
supplies.
An increase in  always decreases aggregate supply since it causes some rms in the
upstream sector to switch from formal to informal. In addition, an increase in  increases
the demand by formal rms at each pi and causes some rms to switch from informal to
formal in the downstream sector. Thus, at each pi; aggregate demand goes up. Hence pi()
increases with :
The supply of the informal sector when pi = pf is some amount in the interval
[0;
R y







d(pi;pi=) xf(d;pi=)gd()d]: If these
intervals overlap, at pi = pi()= then (pi();pi()=) is an equilibrium. This will happen
whenever the tolerance for informality in the upstream sector (y) is high enough.
If these intervals do not overlap the informal supply of the intermediate good must
necessarily go up with : On the other hand, the informal demand at (pi();
pi()
 ) will go
down since pi() goes up and the relative price of the formal good goes down. At  = 1, the
supply of the informal good is
R y

0 maxf;yggu()d whereas the demand is any number in
27the interval [0;
R d(pi;pf)
0 xi(d;pf)gd()d]. Hence there always exists a unique  such that
(pi();pi()=) is an equilibrium.
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30Table 1: Variable Description
Variable Description Obs Mean Std. Dev.
tax reg 1 = Tax Registration 48308 0.130 0.337
tax sub 1 = Tax Substitution 48314 0.179 0.384
large cl 1 = Large Client 48306 0.041 0.199
small cl 1 = Small Client 48306 0.070 0.256
outside hh 1 = Outside Household 48310 0.640 0.480
# employees Number of Employees 48314 1.473 1.044
revenue Revenue in Oct/2003 (R$ 1,000) 47570 2.077 6.276
other job 1 = Owner has Other Job 48288 0.125 0.330
bank loan 1 = Bank Loan 48292 0.062 0.241
education Education Level (Owner) 48253 4.367 1.884
age Age (Owner) 48314 41.026 12.313
gender Gender (Owner) 48312 0.644 0.479
homeowner# rooms Homeowner  Number of Rooms 48040 4.889 3.316
sup enf Supplier Enforcement 47846 0.012 0.010
cl enf Client Enforcement 47846 0.010 0.010
log wage Log of Mean Wage (R$ 1,000) 6491 -1.831 0.855
supplier formal Formalization among Suppliers 47749 0.159 0.035
client formal Formalization among Clients 47846 0.127 0.039
Table 2: Education
1 = No education
2 = Reads and writes
3 = Some primary education
4 = Graduated primary school
5 = Some secondary education
6 = Graduated secondary school
7 = Some College education
8 = Graduated CollegeTable 3: Economic Sector (ECINF)
Freq. % Description
1 5,130 10.62 Transformation and Mineral Extraction Industry
2 7,000 14.49 Construction
3 14,675 30.37 Retail and Repair Services
4 4,104 8.49 Lodging and Food Services
5 4,451 9.21 Transportation and Communications
6 3,125 6.47 Real Estate and Services
7 2,937 6.08 Education, Health and Social Services
8 4,693 9.71 Other Collective, Social and Personal Services
9 2,199 4.55 Other ActivitiesTable 4: Probit Estimates
Dep. Var. = Coe. Marg. E.
tax reg (Std. Err.)
outside hh 0.174 0.021
(0.024)




bank loan 0.379 0.062
(0.033)










homeowner # rooms 0.030 0.004
(0.003)






1. Signicance levels : y : 10%  : 5%  : 1%
2. Standard errors clustered by census tract.Table 5: Probit Estimates (Chain Eects)
Dep. Var. = Coe. Coe. Coe. Coe.
tax reg (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
[Marg. E.] [Marg. E.] [Marg. E.] [Marg. E.]
large cl 0.373 0.331
(0.049) (0.049)
[0.061] [0.051]









N 47196 46654 46749 46744
Pseudo-R2 0.3664 0.3657 0.3722 0.3743
2
 5491.36 5469.05 5597.23 5622.48
1. Signicance levels : y : 10%  : 5%  : 1%
2. Standard errors clustered by census tract.
3. Controls include outside hh, n employee, revenue, bank loan,
other job, education, age, age2, gender, homeown numroom, state
and ECINF sector dummies.Table 6: IV Probit Estimates (Chain Eects)
Non-IV IV First Stage (IV)
Dep. Var. = Coe. Coe. Dep. Var. = Coe.
tax reg (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) large cl (Std. Err.)
large cl 0.343 4.220 educurbsec 0.098
(0.048) (0.371) (0.017)




1. Signicance levels : y : 10%  : 5%  : 1%
2. Controls include outside hh, n employee, revenue, bank loan, other job,
education, age, age2, gender, homeown numroom, state and ECINF sector dummies.
3. The second regression uses the average level of education in the census tract as an
instrument.
4. IV results obtained as bivariate probit.
5. Standard errors clustered by census tract.Table 7: Probit Estimates (Enforcement)
Dep. Var. = Coe. Marg. E. Coe. Marg. E.
tax reg (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
sup enf 5.607 0.724
(1.463)






1. Signicance levels : y : 10%  : 5%  : 1%
2. Standard errors clustered by census tract.
3. Controls include outside hh, n employee, revenue, bank loan,
other job, education, age, age2, gender, homeown numroom,
state and ECINF sector dummies.
Table 8: State SIMPLES Programs (Before 2003)
State State Law # Date State Law # Date
Mato Grosso do Sul1 1866 7/8/1998 Goias1 13270 6/4/1998
Sao Paulo2 10086 11/19/1998 Paraiba 7332 4/28/2003
Rio de Janeiro2 3342 12/29/1999 Espirito Santo1 5389 4/24/1997
Bahia2 7357 11/4/1998 Alagoas2 6271 10/3/2001
Parana1 246 1/29/2003 Rio Grande do Norte3 8296 1/28/2003
Pernambuco2 11157 12/29/1997 Distrito Federal4 2510 12/29/1999
Ceara2 13298 4/2/2003 Sergipe1 4185 12/22/1999
Para3 6616 1/7/2003 Rondonia 8945 12/30/1999
Maranhao1 6904 3/24/1997 Acre1 1340 7/19/2000
Santa Catarina2 11398 5/8/2000 Amapa 1933 6/17/1998
1. http://www.telecentros.desenvolvimento.gov.br
2. Cartilha da Lei Geral (SEBRAE)
3. Secretaria de Fazenda EstadualTable 9: Probit Estimates (SIMPLES)
Dep. Var. = Coecient Marg. E.
tax reg (Std. Err.)










1. Signicance levels : y : 10%  : 5%  : 1%
2. SIMPLES stands for states that implemented a version of
SIMPLES for the VAT.
3. Controls include outside hh, n employee, revenue,
bank loan, other job, education, age, age2, gender,
homeown numroom and ECINF sector dummies.Table 10: Probit Estimates (SIMPLES, Ineligible)
Dep. Var. = Coecient (Std. Err.) Marg. E.
tax reg
Ineligible  SIMPLES  2003  Large Client -0.253 (0.256) -0.028
SIMPLES  2003  Large Client 0.332y (0.178) 0.056
Ineligible  SIMPLES  2003  Small Client -0.198 (0.195) -0.023
SIMPLES  2003  Small Client 0.089 (0.129) 0.013
Ineligible  2003  Large Client -0.069 (0.221) -0.008
2003  Large Client 0.023 (0.153) 0.003
Ineligible  2003  Small Client 0.051 (0.171) 0.007
2003  Small Client 0.005 (0.110) 0.001
Ineligible  SIMPLES  Large Client 0.237 (0.202) 0.037
SIMPLES  Large Client -0.214 (0.143) -0.025
Ineligible  SIMPLES  Small Client 0.327 (0.081) 0.055
SIMPLES  Small Client -0.222 (0.094) -0.026
Ineligible  Large Client 0.378 (0.171) 0.065
Large Client 0.254 (0.122) 0.040
Ineligible  Small Client 0.050 (0.127) 0.007
Small Client 0.244 (0.080) 0.038
Ineligible  SIMPLES 0.046 (0.029) 0.006





1. Signicance levels : y : 10%  : 5%  : 1%
2. SIMPLES stands for states that implemented a version of SIMPLES for the VAT.
3. Controls include outside hh, n employee, revenue, bank loan, other job,
education,age, age2, gender,homeown numroom and ECINF sector dummies.Table 11: Probit Estimates (Tax Substitution)
Full Sample Tax Sub = 1
Variable Coecient Coecient
(Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
large cl 0.428 0.059
(0.049) (0.208)
small cl 0.241 -0.384
(0.036) (0.128)
tax sub large cl -0.406y
(0.213)








1. Signicance levels : y : 10%  : 5%  : 1%
2. Standard errors clustered by census tract.
3. Controls include outside hh, n employee, revenue, bank loan, other job,
education, age, age2, gender, homeown numroom, state and ECINF sector
dummies.Figure 1:  = 0:7; = 0:15;x = 0:05;d;u  U[0;1]
Figure 2:  = 0:4; = 0:17 (sales tax)), x = 0:05;d;u  U[0;1]Figure 3:  = 0:4; = 0:17 (sales tax)), x = 0:05;d;u  U[0;1]